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SHOULD CHILDREN BE AS EQUAL AS PEOPLE?
HON. LINDSAY G. ARTHUR*
In the beginning it was written that "all men are created
equal." The words carried a magic in their simplicity; even though
those who declared them really meant only that all white, adult,
propertied, Christian males are created equal. But the words as
they were written have been a lodestone: the restrictive adjectives
are being removed, each with its own struggle. The courts say
that non-whites are equal, legislatures write laws commanding it.
Property is only distantly remembered as a qualification for equali-
ty, lack of it is now an assurance that all the essentials of life
will come free. The church is so well protected by its separation
from the state that it has substantially lost its influence on public
affairs. Males are struggling for equality. Now the last adjective
is being assaulted. From Berkeley to Columbia, from Kent to Gault,
from Hashbury to hair-do's from vodka to voting to Viet, the
non-adults are demanding equality. But should children be as equal
as people?
... nor shall any state ... deny to any person.., the equal
protection of its laws.
Should children go before children's courts, or, if they are equal
should they go before "real" courts - with real prisons? Should
children have extra laws, such as for drinking, smoking, curfew, dis-
obeying teachers, or, if they are equal, should they only be charged
for "grown-up" offenses? - and drink what they please. Should
children who commit criminal offenses with dangerous weapons be
treated as dangerous criminals? - even if they're only seven years
old. If a woman is married to a drunkard, she can get a divorce;
but can a child, if his mother is a drunkard?-and where does
he go next. If a man's home provides him no satisfactions, he
moves on; should a child? - can a child?
Should people be as equal as children? All children are pro-
vided a free education; are adults denied equal protection of the
laws if they must pay? All children receive food, shelter, and cloth-
* A.B. Princeton University, 1939; LL.B. University of Minnesota, 1946 (converted
to J.D. in 1967) ; DiStrict Judge, State of Minnesota, Juvenile Division; Vice President of
the National Council of Juvenile Court Judges.
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ing with no strings attached; is it unconstitutional not to do the
same for adults? All children are virtually guaranteed a woman's
loving care; are all men entitled to the same guarantee? Should
people be as equal as children?
I. EQUAL PROTECTION
A. Counsel?
• . .no single action holds more potential for achieving pro-
cedural justice for the child in the juvenile court than the
provision of counsel.'
The juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope with
problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to in-
sist upon regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain
whether he has a defense and to prepare and submit it. 2
The question is no longer whether counsel should be provided,
but when, and in what depth. Consider: at the arraignment, the
court offers to appoint a lawyer and to continue the case for a few
days to allow consultation. Because it would mean an additional
hearing, an additional half-day's pay lost, the family rejects the
offer. Is the child denied counsel?
Consider: the child desires an attorney and the parents have
adequate money but refuse to spend it for a lawyer's fee. Is counsel
a necessity for which the parents must pay? Can the court order
them to pay on pain of contempt or can the court charge the
fees to the long-suffering taxpayers?
Consider: the Bar Association provides a list of lawyers who
have volunteered to represent juveniles, but none of the lawyers
have read Gault, the Juvenile Code, or "Standards for Juvenile and
Family Courts. ' 3 Is the child proffered knowledgeable counsel?
Can such counsel comprehend the various and delicate interrelation-,
ships of court, child, parent, probation officer, police, public, press,
school, peers, or institutions? Can any non-metropolitan court af-
ford to have specialized counsel always available?
Consider: should counsel advocate what the child, his client,
wants - what the parents think best for the child - or what
counsel thinks best for the child?
Consider: should counsel see only the clerk's file? Or should he
also see the police file, the social history and the social worker's
notes and sources? Further, should counsel be given access to
1. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRA-
TION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 86 (1967).
2. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967).
3. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, PUB. No. 437,
STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURTS (1966).
205
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
school and psychological data? If all of these should be provided,
how much time and how many lawyers will be needed? 4
Counsel is a constitutional necessity, which should be charge-
able to the parents. He should insist upon time to acquaint him-
self with the facts and the law, hear all that the court sees and
hears, cross-examine those who purvey information or opinion to
the court and advocate that which his client would seek if his
client were mature of thought.
B. Care?
u .-a- the evidence discloses that . . . [the parents] are
caught in a vicious circle of physical incapacity, emotional
strain, and financial distress beyond their capabilities to
master. The net result has been a destruction of any reason-
able hope for a home environment compatible with the wel-
fare of the three young children.5
Children are entitled to parental care. Obviously, if parents
can not, or will not, provide adequate care, society intervenes with
expert social counselling. If this is not sufficient, the children are
removed temporarily while the parents and the home are brought
up to minimal standards. If, despite the best available efforts, there
is no hope of achieving such standards, the children are removed
permanently and placed for adoption or made wards of the state.
It is neat and efficient - and frightening in its aspect of the
social camel's nose prodding under the parental tent. Four words
determine whether parents keep or lose their children: 'adequate
care' and 'minimal standards.' The parents are charged with child
neglect. They are told they may lose their children, which, among
other reactions, they feel as a personal insult. They fight back,
hard.6 As in delinquency, the court becomes more involved in
yesterday's muck than in tomorrow's help - and the help is made
that much harder to accept.
What is "care" becomes important. Physical care: food, shel-
ter, housing, these are easy to measure. Supervisory care: aware-
ness and control of the child's conduct and teaching self-discipline,
4. "In [disposition] hearings ... all evidence helpful in determining the questions
presented, including oral and written reports, may be received by the court . . . (T]he
parties or their counsel shall be afforded an opportunity to examine and controvert writ-
ten reports so received and to cross-examine individuals making the reports. Sources of
confidential information need not be released." UNIFORM JUVENiLE COURT ACT § 29-d (pro-
mulgated July 30, 1968, by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws). This position was endorsed by the National Council of Juvenile Court Judges at
their annual convention in Chicago, June 25, 1968, but with a vigorous and almost unani-
mous dissent to the last phrase.
5. Kennedy v. State, 277 Ala. 5, 166 So.2d 736, 737 (1964).
6. "When existing parent-child relationships fail to meet-or allegedly fail to meet-
commonly accepted community standards, an intense human drama almost inevitably de-
velops." Todd v. Superior Court, 68 Wash.2d 587, 414 Pac.2d 605, 606 (1966).
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these can also be measured, though far too often they are meas-
ured in a delinquency proceeding rather than a neglect proceed-
ing. "Parental neglect, excessive weakness, categorial leniency de-
stroy respect for the law and for those charged with its enforce-
ment. ' 7 Emotional care: giving the child love, an identity and a
sense of security are difficult to measure and yet they are pos-
sibly the most important elements for a stable society. "When I
did something good, I should have gotten some gratitude or some-
thing; and when I did something wrong, I wasn't punished enough.
(My parents) just didn't care very much about me."'8
Society, and its courts, should be concerned with what children
need, not with muck-raking and labelling what they and their par-
ents have done. The focus should be forward: to provide for future
needs, not backward: to correct for past misdeeds.
II. EQUAL PRIVACY
A. Silence?
The privilege can be claimed in any proceeding, be it crimi-
nal or civil, administrative or judicial, investigatory or ad-
judicatory. 9
If the police are questioning a boy about rape, as in Kent;
or threatening phone calls, as in Gault, it is obvious and easy to
say that the accused is entitled to silence, and to be told of his
right to it. "He needs someone on whom to lean lest the over-
powering presence of the law, as he knows it, . . . crush him."' 1
"[T]he statements of adolescents under 18 years of age who are
arrested and charged with violations of law are frequently untrust-
worthy and often distort the truth."'1
[I]t seems probable that where children are induced to
confess by 'paternal' urgings on the part of officials and the
confession is then followed by disciplinary action, the child's
reaction is likely to be hostile and adverse - the child may
well feel that he has been led or tricked into confession and
that despite his confession, he is being punished.
2
Silence is golden and the right to it can be precious. But there
are problems. Confessing to a policeman is rather obviously a pre-
lude to unpleasant consequences; but what of confessing to a school
7. J. Edgar Hoover, Remarks to Masons, Oct. 1965.
8. Comment by an anonymous parolee from Minnesota State Training School for Girls
on "Open Mike for Teens", WCCO Radio, Minneapolis, March 5, 1967.
9. In re Gault, supra note 2, at 47, quoting from Murphy v. Waterfront Commission,
378 U.S. 52, 94 (1964) (concurring opinion).
10. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 600 (1948).
11. In the Matter of Four Youths, 89 Wash. L. Reporter 639 (1961), as quoted in In re
Gault, supra note 2, at 55.
12. In re Gault, supra note 2, at 51-52,
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principal or a coach who passes it on to the police? Should school
principals or coaches be required to give the Miranda warning? Testi-
fying at a court trial is at the very vortex of unpleasant conse-
quences; but what of testifying at a parent inquiry which results in
loss of driving privileges, an early curfew, or a spanking? May
children take the Fifth Amendment with all authority? And if not
all, then should the child have the protection of privileged communi-
cation as to those with whom he has no right of silence?
A child should have the right of silence in all matters with the
police, and in investigations by the schools and other public agen-
cies of conduct criminal for adults; and his communications on
child offenses to the schools and on all matters with his parents
should be privileged.
B. Hearsay?
• . . the court conferred privately with the daughter. .... 1.
When should children testify? Tests for determining their com-
petency are well settled: respect for the oath and capacity to re-
late observed facts. 14 But when should they have to testify? It is
common in custody fights for one party to demand that the child
be brought forth and ordered to state her preferences publicly with
both parents watching, and then the other side demands to cross-
examine. How cruel must courts be? Some courts clear the court-
room of all except counsel and the reporter and all questions are
put by the judge. But the child knows, and is afraid and confused
- and the child's susceptibility has been propagandized by the
person who brought her to court. Hence, this procedure is almost as
cruel and almost as meaningless. Some judges interview the child
alone, without record or counsel. But this is a denial of confronta-
tion, and any appeal taken is at least partially without transcript.
Moreover, this procedure only slightly lessens the fear, propaganda
- and the trauma. Children talk best in their native habitat. What
they say when pressures of emotion and strangeness are absent
is more apt to be true, somewhat analogous to res gestae. Obviat-
ing the need for children to come into court will prevent trauma
to the children, trauma which accomplishes little since court testi-
mony of children is not very reliable.
Under reliable circumstances, out of court statements made by
children pertaining to their relationship with their immediate fam-
ily should be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule.
13. Aske v. Aske, 233 Minn. 540, 543, 47 N.W.2d 417, 419 (1951).
14. State v. Triblett, - Mlnn. , 162 N.W.2d 121 (1968).
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C. Search?
We can agree that the father's "house" may also be that of
the child, but if a man's house is still his castle in which
his rights are superior to the state, those rights should also
be superior to the rights of the children who live in his
house. We cannot agree that a child . . .has the same con-
stitutional rights of privacy in the family home which he
might have in a rented hotel room.
15
The watchword in recent appellate decisions is that children
are entitled to "fairness." Unreasonable search and seizure is as
certainly barred by "fairness" for juveniles as it is by "civil rights"
for adults. So far the answer is simple, but with children there are
the problems that come from dependence. Can school officials
search a child's locker for marijuana - or .38's? Can a probation
officer search a child for switchblades - or zips? Can a YMCA
director search a child's tote basket for LSD - or yellow jackets?
Can a parent search a child's dresser for stolen records - or hub
caps? Somewhere there is a line. Parents cannot be reduced to
search warrants nor school principals to Miranda warnings - or
can thay? If equality is the principle, if children are as equal
as people, then children have the same rights to privacy and
mothers should not read mail, or diaries, or insist on meeting dates.
But, repeat but, if parents have a right to invade the privacy of
their children, where does inequality stop: at home, church, school,
psychologist's office, or the police station? Should inequality stop
at age fourteen, seventeen, nineteen, or at emancipation? A cruel
rule may be necessary but one which lets parents be parents and
schools be schools and doctors be doctors, and lets them inquire
into the needs and problems of children and act according to their
best judgement.
Those legally responsible for providing children with necessities
should be entitled to make, or authorize, reasonable - or unreason-
able - searches and seizures.
D. Arrest?
. . . the law of arrest does not apply to the taking into cus-
tody of minors."6
Such action shall not be deemed an arrest but shall be
deemed a measure to protect the health, morals, and well-
being of the juvenile.1
7
15. State v. Kinderman, 271 Minn. 405, 409, 136 N.W.2d 577, 580 (1965).
16. In re James L. - Jr., 25 Ohio Op.2d 369, 194 N.E.2d 797, 798 (1963).
17. State v. Smith, 32 N.J. 501, 161 A.2d 520, 534 (1960).
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A child may be taken into custody without the safeguards of
observation or reasonable suspicion that protect an adult. But what
does the child receive in return: a separate place of detention-in
some metropolitan areas; friendly and interested counsellors-some-
times; no bars on the windows, no echoing corridors, no clanking
locks-just psychiatric screen, shiny tiled walls, and electronic
listening. It doesn't seem an even shake! Liberty is at least as
precious to children, maybe more so, since time curiously means
so much more to children who have so much more of it. Everyone
arrested is allowed one phone call. Everyone knows this axiom to
be true, even though finding it in any lawbook makes an inter-
esting search. How effective is one phone call to an absent or
drunken parent, or to a friend whose mother says he's in bed, or
doing his homework, or to a lawyer-and how many children know
a lawyer?
Arrest for children is at least as serious as arrest for adults.
It should have the same rules whatever name is given it and
a call should be completed to a supportive, competent adult advising
him of the arrest within a reasonable time.
III. EQUAL INNOCENCE
A. Bail?
The right to release without excessive bail, guaranteed by
constitutions and statutes in criminal cases, is neither his-
torically nor logically a part of civil or equitable proceed-
ings such as occur in juvenile court .... IS
Bail is money deposited to guarantee return of an arrested
person at his next hearing. Does a twelve year old child appreciate
the difference between five hundred dollars and five thousand? Can
he comprehend how many hours of sweat go into five hundred dol-
lars, or how many shoes, hamburgers, aspirins or blankets it will
buy? Does he care that his father has mortgaged his home, or
his mother her engagement ring? Can children understand money-
someone else's money-well enough to be bound by it? A child should
not be detained in the first place unless he is dangerous or a run-
ner.1 9 If he is dangerous, money on bail will not make him less
so, especially the money of someone intimate enough to ante it
up for the child and thus probably so intimate as to be, to the child,
responsible for the confinement in the first place. And if the child
18. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY (CRIMINAL LAW SECTION) OF
THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN JUVENILE COURT PROCEEDINGS
(1966).
19. Supra note 3, at 60.
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is a runner, isn't he most apt to be running from precisely the
people who will be offering the bail?
Bail should not be available for children unless it is clearly
demonstrated that the money or the bond or the property will in
fact be compelling upon the child to return for the subsequent hear-
ing.
B. Grand Jury?
[T]he constitutional right to a grand jury indictment
as a preliminary to prosecution is inapplicable to juvenile
court proceedings involving children charged with mis-
deeds .20
A grand jury protects a citizen from the expense and stigma of
a criminal charge. In juvenile court, counsel is guaranteed and the
lack of a public trial guarantees that no stigma or inference will
be attached to the mere fact of a charge.
The reasoning for the Grand Jury does not exist ,for children.
Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex.
C. Notice?
Notice, to comply with due process requirements, must be
given sufficiently in advance of scheduled court proceedings
so that reasonable opportunity to prepare will be afforded,
and it must "set forth the alleged misconduct with particular-
ity."
2 1
The immediate tendency of many juvenile courts was to shift
to the jargon of indictments, making the notice satisfactory to ap-
pellate courts-and considerably less intelligible to the family. The
essential is plain language, 22 with sufficient detail as to time, place,
names and actions to advise of the claims which will be presented
to the court. Amassing of synonyms and adjectives actually works
towards a denial of due process by obfuscation. But the right to
notice raises other problems: is the child entitled to notice and are
both parents, if separated? What of the offense which comes to
light in the pre-disposition investigation? Can the court consider it
without further notice and arraignment? Must the notice specify
the particular subdivision of the particular statute allegedly vio-
lated and be held to this and no other? What facts must be plead-
ed and proven to demonstrate "incorrigibility," "waywardness," or
"habitual misconduct"? If a child steals a car to escape a drunken
father, must the pleader be forced to choose either delinquency or
neglect, or is "fact pleading" permissible? The public is concerned
20. Antieau, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46 CORNELL L. Q. 387, 393, (1961).
21. In re Gault, supra note 2, at 33.
22. In re Hitzemann, Minn. - , 161 N.W.2d 542 (1968).
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that courts intervene into the lives or individuals when necessary,
but only when necessary. The family is concerned with knowing
what it is that has called down authority upon them. And the court
is concerned with what, if anything, the child needs which the court
can provide.
The notice must allege sufficient facts to show the child's need
and the court's authority, in language a layman can understand.
D. Proof?
We live in a sea of semantic disorder .... 23
"Beyond a reasonable doubt," "fair preponderance of the evi-
dence," "clear and convincing" and "persuasive to reasonable
men" are standards that have been advanced. At the risk of being
sacrilegious, it is suggested that however much the standard mouth-
ings are defined, the test that will in fact be applied is simply
whether the trier of the fact is "pretty sure," or not. It matters
little when what formula is ordered, only that he who applies it
realizes that American liberty is a precious thing.
After all, what we are striving for is not merely "equal" jus-
tice for juveniles. They deserve much more than being af-
forded only the privileges and protections that are applied
to their elders. A niggardly and indiscriminate granting of
concepts of justice applied to adults will stunt the growth of





All the powerful reasons that have long justified the drafts-
men of our constitutions in enshrining the right to a speedy
trial apply in cases where juveniles are accused of mis-
conduct.
25
The argument is made that speedy trial is a criminal right
and therefore not available in juvenile proceedings which are by
nature non-criminal.2 6 That the consequences of juvenile court dis-
positions may be at least as unwanted by the child as criminal
sentencing is unwanted by adults was pointed out in Gault, with the
comment that:
it would be extraordinary if our Constitution did not
23. Pres. Dwight D. Eisenhower, State of the Union Message, Jan. 1960.
24. Chief Justice Earl Warren, Address to the National Council of Juvenile Court
Judges, Vol. 15, No. 3 Juv. CT. JU)GES J. 14 (1964).
25. Antieau, supra note 20, at 398.
26. Harling v. United States, 295 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
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require the procedural regularity and the exercise of care
implied in the phrase "due process.
' 2
B. Local Trial?
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a . . . trial [in] the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed .... 28
Most juvenile codes provide for trial, at least optionally, not
at the county where the offense was allegedly committed but at
the child's county of residence upon the theory that the child is
better protected in his home county by his parents, better known
in his home county to those who must devise a treatment for him,
and better supervised in his treatment in his home county by the
court where he will be living. The theory is sound in all respects,
but it seems to run counter to the Constitution unless:
Where it is to the child's own interest, the criminal analogy
can be disregarded and the jurisprudence can revert to the
child's welfare, and to the pre-Gault concept of the juvenile
court as a derivation of equity, interested in best using so-
ciety's power to help children.29
C. Subpoena?
What can be in doubt? What can be said in opposition?
D. Public Trial?
Anyone who enjoys seeing his name in print as a lawbreaker
is a potential criminal, and the sooner he's put away the bet-
ter.
Publicity is painful but necessary. Most people have good
youngsters they want to keep away from the hoodlums.
How can they do it if they don't know who the hoodlums are?
Giving publicity to a delinquent doesn't destroy him. In all
cases I have seen it has improved his behavior.
Judge Lester Loble °
In one short year .. . in the court presided over by (Judge
Lester Loble) there has been a 58 per cent increase . . . in
juvenile felony cases. . . .1
Publicizing a juvenile delinquent brands him-and his brothers
27. In re Gault, supra note 2, at 27-28.
28. U.S. CONST. Amend. VI.
29. See State ex rel Knutson v. Jackson, 249 Minn. 246, 82 N.W.2d 234 (1957).
30. Montana'. Experiment with Juvenile Crime, Vol. 75, No. 6 AMERICAN LEGION MAGA-
ZINE 50 (1963).
31. Open Hearings in Juvenile Courts in Montana, Statement by the National Council
on Crime and Delinquency (Nov. 1964).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
and sisters-and isolates him into the company of other delinquents,
with little preventative effect. But, not publicizing delinquency pro-
ceedings threatens both the child and the public that their proper
interests will be arbitrarily handled--or ignored. Traditionally the
adult courts have accepted the public's "right to know" as a needed
protection both to the accused and the victim, and upon an un-
proven belief that punishment is a deterrent to others. In their
brief history of only some seven decades, the juvenile courts have
accepted the child's "right to privacy" as a more needed protection
from public retribution. There are five principal influences attribut-
ed to public trial. First, it protects the accused from an arbitrary
court. But a lawyer, a court reporter, and an appellate court can
provide better protection. Second, it assures the victim that an eye
has been given for his eye. But the lex talionis has been repealed.
3 2
Third, it deters others from criminal conduct by fear of known
punishment. But there is better authority to the effect that the
real deterrent is the fear of getting caught.3 3 Fourth, it drives the
guilty into further crime by isolating them into a criminal environ-
ment, publicity's real fault.3 4 Fifth, it protects the public from
judicial disregard of dangerous conduct, publicity's real value. A
simple rule which protects the public without needless harm to the
accused, and without duly restricting freedom of the press requires
that: news media should be accorded full access to juvenile court
proceedings, but should be forbidden to identify any participating
juvenile.
E. Jury Trial?
A jury trial would inevitably bring a good deal more for-
mality to the juvenile court without giving a youngster a
demonstrably better fact-finding process than trial before a
judge.
3 5
A jury of peers is a protection to both the public and the in-
dividual from authority and judicial whim. Peers have a degree of
sympathy, they can relate to the accused and understand in some
measure his idiom and his world. But children are children's peers,
and children can't be tried by a jury of children. Yet adults can't
understand long hair, and teeny-bop talk, and the driving fear of
being left out, and the perplexing problem of identity for a chang-
ing body with a changing mind in a changing world. Adults can be
taken in by giving a hoodlum a suit, a tie, and a crew cut, and
32. The gospel according to St. Matthew (circa 110) Ch. 5, v. 38-44.
33. "It is accepted in the police world that it is not fear of punishment that deters the
criminal, but fear of being foutnd out." Kurt Lindroth, Deputy Director of State Police for
Sweden, quoted from THE ROTARIAN 32 (Aug. 1968).
34. See "Comment" to UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT ACT, § 24, supra note 4.
35. Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REv. 547, 559 (1957).
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adults can be put out by the normal rebellion of children striving
for independence. Possibly judges who are in constant touch with
juveniles come closest to being their peers-if empathy is peerage.
And in a court of equity, from which the juvenile courts have evolv-
ed, it was thought that: where remedies were needed beyond law's
rigidities, justice can better come from judges than from juries.
F. Confrontation?
• . . the right to confront witnesses . . . essentially includes
the right of effective cross-examination by defendant's
counsel of witnesses against the defendant.
36
If the right belongs to the child to see and hear everything
the judge sees and hears, it's a little thing; if it belongs to the
parents it's a little more; if to counsel, certainly quite a deal more.
Children may not be mature enough to absorb adverse testimony
and react with intelligent counter-attack. Parents become emotional
about criticism of their children-and far more emotional at sugges-
tions it may be parental fault. Counsel can protect the rights in-
volved, and can better comprehend and be unemotional about
the domestic can-of-worms that appears in so many delinquency
and neglect cases.
Confrontation without a lawyer is nearly meaningless. Counsel




The doctrine of double jeopardy is one of ancient origin and
is designed to prevent the prosecution of a person a second
time when he has already been subjected to the risk of
"life and limb" in a prior trial. The concept clearly con-
templates that the action which bars a second prosecution
must be instituted in a court which has the power to . . .
punish . . . [but] . . . the juvenile act does not contem-
plate the punishment of the children. .... 37
Children are not punished by the courts; but then neither are
adults. They are both reformed and rehabilitated, they are made
penitent. "The fact of the matter is that, however euphemistic the
title, a 'receiving home' or an 'industrial school' for juveniles is an
institution of confinement .... -3" If a child is threatened denial
of his liberty, however high the motive of him who denies it, is the
36. 32 J. oF AM. TRIwAL LAWYERS 570 (1968).
37. Moquin v. State, 216 Md. 524, 140 A.2d 914, 916 (1958).
38. In re Gault, supra note 2, at 27.
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liberty any less important than that of an adult?
If a child's freedom of movement has been put at stake, for
whatever noble purpose, he has been in jeopardy.
B. Punishment?
In making dispositions some judges will use some device
that will "shock" the child . . . fines can be used construc-
tively, if they are not too heavy. .... 39
Are "shock" dispositions "cruel and unusual"? Watch a seven-
teen year old suburban boy when his license is suspended for drink-
ing beer! Are fines or restitution, which to a child amounts to the
same thing, "excessive"? If a child wraps a stolen car around a
telephone pole, is $2,000.00 restitution, ordered as part of delinquency
rehabilitation, an excessive fine? Is it "cruel" to require delinquents
to clean soft drink cans from the side of a highway - or is it in-
voluntary servitude? Curiously, the Constitution does not prohibit
cruel punishments nor does it prevent unusual punishments; it only
prohibits cruel and unusual punishments. Flogging is cruel, but ap-
parently may be used if it always has been. Taking care of senile
patients is unusual, but may apparently be used if it is not trau-
matic. What is prohibited is "considerations of expediency, the
satisfaction of public indignation, or example . . . [as] . . . con-
trary to the whole spirit of the juvenile act. '40 Fines and resti-
tution may be used, if not excessive for the particular child.
The great advancement of the juvenile courts is that they can
be imaginative and flexible: that they can design a package of dis-
positions to fit the needs of a particular child.
C. Transcript?
an indigent parent who is . . . aggrieved is entitled to
a free transcript, the cost of which shall be assumed by
the county out of appropriate welfare funds.41
Appeal without a transcript is like reviewing a book without
reading it. Yet how much should the transcript contain-just for-
mal testimony and exhibits, or the social report with its hearsay and
conclusions? When it is free, what controls should be used to pre-
vent over-ordering? Should it contain everything the judge hears and
sees, including a probation officer's casual corridor comment, or
a newspaper story? And how does one include the personal knowl-
edge that a judge in a smaller community has of the people in his
district? The need for a transcript of the arraignment and the ad-
39. ADVISORY COUNCIL OF JUDGES OF THE NATIONAL PROBATION AND PAROLE ASSOCIATION,
GUIDES FOR JUVENILE COURT JUDGES, 79-80 (1957).
40. State v. Myers, 74 N.D. 297, 22 N.W.2d 199, 201 (1946).
41. In re Munklewitz, - Minn,-, - N.W.2d-(1968).
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judicatory hearing are obvious. The dispositional hearing is more
difficult: it is far less formal-or should be; it includes more dis-
cussion than evidentiary presentation; it may be based on opinions,
phone calls with counsel, hearsay and much consideration of facial
expression, chosen attire, tone of voice, gait, gum, glare, slouch-
all the ingredients important in the decision, but impossible for in-
clusion in a transcript. But the disposition is almost entirely for
the trial judge.
42
A transcript of that which is transcriptive and necessary to the
appealled issue is sufficient-if appellate courts continue to recog-
nize the impact of un-transcriptive matter.
D. Appeal?
This court has not held that a State is required by the Fed-
eral Constitution "to provide appellate courts or a right to
appellate review at all.
' ' 43
Appeal, next to the right of counsel, is the great protection
against an arbitrary, ignorant or uncaring trial court. "The powers of
the Star Chamber were a trifle in comparison with those of our juve-
nile courts .... -44 Appeal should be as of right. It should be readily
available and financially feasible. It should be expeditious, par-
ticularly for children for whom treatment should be temporally
close to misconduct. Morris Kent was in his twenties when his case
was remanded to the court for children. Appeal should be anony-
mous, consistent with the juvenile doctrine of confidentiality: the
Gault boy, the Kent boy, the Whittington boy have either too much
stigma or too much status. Other children, who should appeal, are
often loath to follow them-or their parents shun the publicity.
Appeal is the only real protection against an improper trial
court. It should be easily and readily available.
VI. EQUAL EXPRESSION
A. Religion?
the educated Chinese conscience . . . does not insult
God by believing that he is a merciless Legalist, a stick-
and-carrot deity who rules through a system of unimaginable
rewards and awful punishments. .... 45
May children choose their religion-or lack of it? If they are
old enough to drive, to die, to procreate, to marry, to drop out of
school-are they old enough to drop out of church, to move to an
42. In re Lewis, 11 N.J. 217, 94 A.2d 328 (1953).
43. In re Gault, supra note 2, at 58.
44. Roscoe Pound, Foreword to YOUNG, SOCIAL TREATMENT IN PROBATION AND DELIN-
QUENCY xxvii (1937), quoted from In re Gault, supra note 2, at 18.
45. BLOODWORTH, THE CHINESE LOOKING GLASS (1967).
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"activist" church, or to follow Malcolm X? When can children de-
cide that they are fed-up with Sunday School, except the dancing,
hay-riding, boy-meet-girl part? If they enjoy the right to counsel,
regardless of their parents, do they also enjoy the right to free-
dom of religion regardless of their parents-or does religion matter
that much any more or is religion too important to trust to the young?
A child old enough to die is old enough to affirm, "0 unbe-
lievers! I will not worship that which ye worship; nor will ye
worship that which I worship . . . Ye have your religion,
and I my religion.
' ' 46
B. Statement?
When a nation silences criticism and dissent, it deprives
itself of the power to correct its errors.
4 7
Do children have the right of free speech-in four-letter
words? Do they have the right of free press-in scurrilous, under-
ground rags? Can children criticize their teachers or their parents?
May parents censor? May parents listen in on their children's phone
calls? May they read their children's mail, both incoming and out-
going? If children have the right of silence, do they also have the
right of expression? If children are entitled to cross-examine wit-
nesses who accuse them, do they also have the right to cross-
examine parents who accuse them? How far do we go with equality?
If children are to be as adults, must they not then lose their child-
hood? If children are too immature to speak, to print, to assemble,
to petition, to worship, are they not also too immature to resist
search, to waive counsel, to confront witnesses, to read notice? If
children are incapable of exercising some rights, how can they be
capable of exercising others?
Children should be allowed to speak their dreams and their
accusations privately or in public when they are mature enough to
listen to the accusations of others and accord them their dreams
and their frustrations.
C. Conduct?
* . . a nation bent on turning out robots might insist that
every male have a crew cut and every female wear pig-
tails. But the ideas of 'life, liberty, and the pursuit of hap-
piness,' expressed in the Declaration of Independence, later
found specific definition in the Constitution itself, including
of course, freedom of expression and a wide zone of privacy.
I had supposed those guarantees permitted idiosyncracies to
46. The Koran (circa 652) Ch. 109.
47. Henry Steele Commager, Historian.
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flourish, especially when 'they concern the image of one's
personality and his philosophy toward government and his
fellow men.
4
Can children do as they please? Obviously not. They can't hurt
others; but can they hurt themselves? They can't hurt the sensibili.
ties of others but can they wear their skirts short, or their hair
long? Must they wash, and shave, and use curlers, and brassieres?
Must 'they come home when ordered by law or custodian? But if
society, or churches, or schools, or policemen, or parents can limit
attire, or appearance, can they also limit speech, and press, and
assembly? Are children to be deprived of all right of decision the
day before their twenty-first birthday-and have full right of deci-
sion the next day? Shouldn't maturity and judgement be the test,
rather than the calendar? But then, of course, many adults might
lose their rights.
Let children have their fads and their foibles; so long as the
sensibilities of too many others are not invaded too much, it is
the safety valve of youthful effervescence, and the re-germination
of our culture.
VII. EQUAL WAIVER
We appreciate that special problems may arise with respect
to waiver of the privilege by or on behalf of children, and
that there may well be some differences in technique - but
not in principle - depending on the age of the child and the
presence and competence of parents.
49
If children are equal, or even a little bit equal, they have
rights. Rights can be the bane of existence for Authority. Rights
can't be just presumed to be known, they must be made known.
Rights have to be observed, or Authority will be humiliated by the
courts' suppression of evidence. Rights get in the way of Authority's
proper investigation. But they can be waived, and for adults this is
Authority's out, because Authority can easily persuade adults to
waive-sometimes Authority can hardly finish intoning the Miranda
Formula before admissions come bubbling out. An adult can waive
for himself his own right to silence, to counsel, to notice, to con-
frontation, or to jury-but can a child? He's too young to drink, to
vote, to marry, to contract, or to soldier. Is he too young to waive?
Can anyone waive for him? If there is no waiver possible without
a lawyer, how can the police investigate a car theft or a "gang
shag"? How can a department store investigate a shoplifting or ob-
48. 37 U.S.L.W. 3023 (1968).
49. -In re Gault, sepra note 2, at 55.
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scene shouting? How can a school investigate truancy or nickel-
and-dime extortion? How can a physician investigate battering or
incest? How can a welfare worker investigate incorrigibility due to
immorality by night or abandonment by day? Pragmatism demands
waiver; fairness refines the demand. A method for juvenile waiver
is a fundamental necessity, a method which will protect the child
and not hamstring the public. It cannot be founded upon age be-
cause some hoodlums are constitutionally sophisticated at thirteen
and some Boy Scouts ignorant at eighteen of their protections from
Authority, and some people are not endowed with the brains ever
to learn. So waiver cannot be a factor of age. Neither can it be
founded upon the presence of an adult because some parents are
uncaring or afraid, and some school people uninterested except in
peace and order, and some probation officers are almost Author-
ity themselves. There will never be enough lawyers to be available
whenever a child has a right to exercise. It must be a method
usable by the police in the turmoil of tempers and by the judiciary in
the calmness of courtrooms.
Waiver should be permitted by a child of whatever age, or in his
behalf by a concerned adult of whatever relationship, if the child or
the friend understands the right to be waived, the consequences of
waiving it, and believes waiver not to be harmful to the child.
CONCLUSION
A child at birth has no ability to choose between optional courses
of conduct. Gradually he learns to recognize increasingly compli-
cated facts. Gradually he learns to forecast the consequences of in-
creasingly complicated acts. Gradually he learns to compare the
advantages and disadvantages of increasingly complicated avail-
able alternatives. He should be given the freedom to choose between
alternatives only when he can recognize each alternative, forecast its
consequences, and compare the advantages and disadvantages.
Without such maturity, his choice between available alternatives
may be needlessly harmful to himself, or to others. But for every
choice which he is too immature to make, as for every need he is
unable to provide, he is entitled to the protection of a mature per-
son who will make the choice and provide the need in his best inter-
est.
Some day a person's identification card will show his Maturity
Quotient which will change from time to time, but not much more
often than his height and weight and face. It will be very
useful for determining when a person may drink or drive or vote or
read pornography or choose his church or authorize search or un-
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derstand notice or, most important, waive counsel. Until then we
must devise more complicated and more rigid restrictions and grants
of juvenile freedom and juvenile equality.
Should children be as equal as people? Certainly not. They
should not have equal liberty: they should have less. Neither should
they have equal protection-they should have more. How much less
and how much more will depend on the maturity of the particular
child at the particular time.50
50. For a careful and exhaustive casebook treatment of juvenile court law by two
leading experts in the field, see M. PAULSEN AND 0. KETCHAM, JUVENIL COURTS (1967).
